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Account of “A” Company Attack on 
Troteval Farm by the Fusiliers 
Mont-Royal on 24 July 1944
Major Jacques Dextraze (as given to Captain Joseph Engler at Caen), 30 July 1944
On 20 July, four days before this attack, my battalion had put 
in an attack on Beauvoir (043614) 
and Troteval (051613) Farms and 
Verrières (052602). That attack ended 
with our holding Beauvoir Farm but 
we were not successful in taking 
Troteval Farm or Verrières. We 
suffered heavy casualties. Soon my 
Commanding Officer was told that it 
was essential that Troteval Farm be 
captured. This was necessary because 
4th Brigade was going to attack using 
as a starting line the East-West road 
which runs just North of Troteval 
Farm. To secure the starting line the 
farm had to be ours. The battalion 
itself was not yet reinforced to the 
point where a full company could 
be spared for the attack on Troteval 
Farm. Actually cooks and drivers 
were being placed in the trenches 
to hold what ground we had taken. 
Because of this numerical lack in 
the battalion, I was given the job of 
selecting a hand-picked company of 
75 all ranks for the attack on Troteval 
Farm.
 Troteval Farm itself consists of 
a walled enclosure divided into an 
orchard to the South and gardens to 
the North with the farmhouse and 
courtyard proper on the centre of the 
left flank. It is surrounded by open 
wheat fields. The night was clear and 
there was moonlight and visibility 
was excellent.
 The force of the enemy was 
estimated to be about two platoons 
with six tanks. He had a valuable 
observation post (OP) at 060606.
 My general plan was that, from 
a starting line about 1000 yards NE 
of the farm, the company should 
advance with two platoons up and 
one in reserve. On the 24 July at 2000 
hours we crossed the starting line, 
which was merely a position in the 
open wheat fields stretching from 
about 043619 to 047623. Our advance 
was through full-grown wheat fields 
although the right platoon did meet 
some fields of more open ground. 
The forward platoons were to encircle 
the flanks of the farm and, once 
they were in position and almost 
simultaneously, the reserve platoon 
was to strike the farm from the 
NW corner as the forward platoons 
opened fire from the flanks. Then 
as the centre platoon cleared the 
buildings and the orchard to the 
South, the reserve platoons were to be 
moving their southernmost sections 
around to the rear so that the rear 
would be covered with fire and the 
cut-off completed.
 In support I had 1 squadron of 
tanks, 1 field regiment, 1 medium 
regiment, 4.2-inch mortars, and the 
3-inch mortars of the Fusiliers Mont-
Royal and the South Saskatchewan 
Regiment. The tanks were in the 
rear covering each flank. The 3-inch 
mortars were to give fire for 20 
minutes on our very open left flank. 
From H minus 30 to H plus 4 the 
mediums were to play on the farm. 
From H plus 15 to H plus 19 they fired 
on Verrières and Tilly-la-Campagne. 
From H plus 15 the artillery lifted 
Abstract: General J.A. Dextraze, “J Dex” 
to Canada’s post-war army, served as 
Chief of the Defence Staff from 1972 to 
1975 but in 1944 he was a 24-year-old 
company commander in Les Fusiliers de 
Mont-Royal (FMR). This account of the 
action carried out by his company on 24 
July 1944 offers a graphic description 
of the challenges confronting the 
Canadians during the battles for 
Normandy. This attack was conducted 
to clear the start line for Operation 
Spring which would commence the next 
day. Though written in the first person, 
this report was drafted by Captain Joe 
Engler, the historical officer assigned to 
2nd Canadian Infantry Division. It was 
his job to collect important documents 
and records, as well as to conduct 
interviews with the fighting soldiers, 
which would allow later historical 
narratives to be accurately written. 
Engler had the dubious distinction of 
being the only historical officer to be 
killed in action when he drove into an 
ambush on 1 October 1944.
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but the field regiment remained on 
call. Two anti-tank guns were also in 
support and these I planned to place 
behind the farm itself to cover our 
flanks. Task 2 for the 3-inch mortars 
was around the area of the Verrières-
Hubert-Folie road. The 4.2-inch 
mortars gave us screening fire in the 
area northeast of Tilly-la-Campagne 
from H plus 20 to H plus 40. I put 
eight light machine guns at point 
045614. These came into action at H 
plus 45. Belts of defensive fire were 
ready to be laid completely around 
the objective by 6 Field Regiment.
 We moved very close, only 75 
yards from our barrage, taking the 
chance, in this case luckily, that no 
one would be hit. My appreciation 
was that there were so many men in 
the farm that if my force of 75 had 
been 300 yards behind the barrage, 
the force in the farm would have had 
time to reorganize in such strength 
as to prevent us from seizing and 
holding the farm.
 My advance was very fast, about 
80 yards per minute. The centre 
platoon rushed for the northwest 
corner as soon as the flank fire 
platoons were in place. As the platoon 
went in from the northwest corner, the 
flanking platoon sent their sections to 
the rear to give a cut-off by cross-fire 
so that the farm was surrounded with 
automatic fire. At that moment there 
were no bodies behind the farm so 
that the clearing platoon was able 
to fire freely without endangering 
the other platoons. We reached our 
objective about 2015 hours. Clearing 
the farm took about 15 minutes. 
Just as we waited nearby for the 
artillery to lift we could see Jerry 
running through the orchard and 
farm buildings from the fields with 
neither helmets nor weapons. Tanks 
appeared very shortly afterwards 
and opened on the flank platoons. 
We replied by attacking them with 
PIATs and grenades. The tanks had 
been harboured just over a small crest 
and appeared first about 150 yards 
from the farm.
 When a force is small in relation 
to the objective it seeks to hold, 
consolidation should be close on the 
objective. In this case we of course 
did not consolidate in the farm but 
we did not go more than 50 yards 
away from it except the rear platoon 
which covered a rather larger area. 
The forward platoons remained 
close around the farm. It is not wise 
to consolidate three or four hundred 
yards past an objective, unless one 
has considerable force. In this case 
we occupied the slit trenches Jerry 
himself had built.
 At 0200 hours we received an 
order to withdraw by 0300 hours 
because tanks were moving in on me 
on the left flank, and brigade planned 
to bring artillery on them to get rid of 
them. I could not report these because 
my wireless was off and I felt that in 
any case we were dug in and were in 
little danger. Originally there were 
six tanks hull-down just on the crest 
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about 150 yards south of Troteval 
Farm. When they approached us we 
attacked them with PIATs and No.36 
grenades. Four of them moved off to 
the southwest and two others moved 
to the southeast. Finally we heard 
them again about 0200 hours when 
we were ordered to withdraw. The 
medium artillery fire drove them 
away although it probably did not 
injure them. At 0300 hours I pulled 
out with all my men except one 
section of one platoon which I left 
against orders in order to protect our 
anti-tank guns. The men came out 
gradually and orderly. At this time 
there was a great deal of shelling and 
air attack as well. When the artillery 
shoot was finished, we re-occupied 
the farm without opposition.
 My men took only their weapons, 
skeleton web, and a ground sheet 
in which was rolled a tin of bully-
beef and some hard-tack. Each man 
carried two No.36 grenades and with 
each Bren there were 15 magazines. 
No body armour was worn.
 I had 18 Brens instead of the usual 
9 and thus had only Bren groups. The 
No.2s carried rifles and the section 
leaders carried Stens, but there 
were no rifle groups as such. Each 
platoon had one PIAT and six Brens, 
a total of 25 men per platoon. The 
actual clearing of the farm was done 
with light machine guns and No.36 
grenades. The Brens were carried 
with a sling and when held firmly 
against the hip were as flexible as was 
necessary. Our section leaders picked 
up rifles which they found in the 
area, which belonged to the men of 
my battalion who had been casualties 
during the attack two days ago. The 
This air photograph of Troteval and 
Beauvoir Farms was taken on 9 July 
1944 before the area saw much fighting. 
The start line for the FMR attack was in 
the top left corner of the photograph.
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artillery had knocked holes in the 
walls and in most of the buildings, 
but one building had no opening in 
it and a PIAT was used to cut a way 
through. The PIAT explosion brought 
Jerry crawling out.
 The enemy of course did not 
occupy the farm but had light 
machine guns in the corners of the 
orchard. He was outside in the 
fields when our shells came down, 
apparently caught unexpectedly. He 
never thought we were so close. The 
garden and orchard had snipers and 
they were out in the fields as well. We 
found slit trenches inside the walls 
and outside. Machine gun posts were 
Lieutenant-Colonel Jacques Dextraze examines 
a map prior to an operation late in the war 
when he commanded the Fusiliers Mont-Royal.
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located in the two northern corners of 
the wall and to the southwest in the 
field.
 His defences included a string 
of mines about 50 yards from the 
farm circling all around it, flat on 
the ground with just a bit of hay to 
cover the mines. We lost two carriers 
because of these. We found one 
sniper in the orchard tied into a tree 
with ropes. He must have stayed 
there through the barrage with only 
his ammunition and rifle and how 
he stood our fire I don’t know. No 
snipers were upstairs at the windows. 
In reply to our shelling Jerry shelled 
the right and left flanks of the farm. 
He evidently did not expect our entry 
to be from the corner on diagonal. 
Because we stayed so close to the 
barrage, his DF fire came down where 
he expected us to be at this time, 
that is, a safe distance behind us. His 
snipers were poor shots but his tanks 
were good.
 Jerry is no good at night. He 
needs only noise to frighten him 
away. On one occasion a burst of Bren 
fire unaimed into a field caused him 
to pull out from the area.
 Our artillery was marvellous. 
All its defensive fire tasks were 
carried out when requested and 
Verrières, Tilly-la-Campagne, and 
the areas northwest of Verrières were 
surrounded with belts of fire, in fact 
there was protective fire all round. 
This fire was very accurate. I left two 
sections to protect my anti-tank guns 
on withdrawal and my men were 150 
yards from the farm itself. Fire came 
down on the farm, yet no men were 
hit. The rest of the company had 
pulled out five minutes before the 
barrage began.
Lessons
1. Vehicles must have sand-bags in 
them and officers must check to 
see that they remain in. This will 
save lives and vehicles.
2. Always tell your men exactly 
w h e r e  y o u ,  t h e  c o m p a n y 
commander, will be at various 
phases of the battle. The platoon 
commanders and section leaders 
will come for no reason at all or 
will invent silly errands to come 
and see if you are there. Knowing 
you are there reassures them. Do 
not let them worry. If the wireless 
link with battalion is out, do not 
mention it, merely tell them all 
is well. When they know where 
you are and feel that you are 
confident they themselves will 
be confident and aggressive.
3. The commander must stay 
back, until the show is over, at 
a point where he can view all 
his forces or at least know what 
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Troteval and Beauvoir Farms, along with 
the village of Verrières, are visible in this 
air photo was taken on 30 July 1944, 
almost a week after the FMR operation.
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they are doing. It is unwise to 
go forward because the risk of 
losing a commander is serious 
and because he must be able 
to see the whole battle if he is 
to influence it. If he is with the 
forward platoon he is unable to 
find out what the other platoons 
are doing. There are other ways 
and other places for the company 
commander to show that he is 
not afraid.
4. When advancing go slowly and 
thoroughly. Burn every haystack. 
Clear a few houses thoroughly 
and not many haphazardly.
5. We have a preponderance of 
equipment and should use it 
boldly.
6. Don’t consolidate too far forward 
of your objective if you have a 
small force.
7. Stretcher-bearers should be well 
forward.
8. Weapons must be picked up from 
casualties and kept with the part 
of the company which is still 
fighting.
9. Reinforcements  should,  i f 
possible, accustom themselves 
to battle gradually.
10. Take chances with the artillery 
barrage, being close to it is 
essential. Where sticky fighting 
is likely, for example in a village 
clearing, the artillery lift should 
be so arranged that thoroughness 
in clearing does not mean losing 
the barrage.
11. Men never forget. An officer’s 
influence on his men in times 
o f  ac t ion  var ies  wi th  the 
consideration he has shown them 
in training. If they respect him 
during training they will respond 
to his control under fire.
12. Defensive fire tasks must be laid 
down all around the objective 
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Before and after photos of Troteval farm taken on 9 and 30 July show much destruction. Apart for the 
obvious shell holes in the fields, a close examination reveals breaches in the wall around the farm, de-roofed 
buildings and numerous other physical scars.
beforehand. There is neither 
time nor opportunity in action to 
indicate targets.
13. Supporting arms are the key 
to success. Their use must be 
carefully planned.
14. When the enemy comes out 
unarmed with his hands up or 
with the evident intention to 
surrender, don’t shoot him. This 
saves a lot of trouble for if the 
first few are treated properly the 
whole bunch will follow. Caution 
however, is necessary.
LC
M
SD
S 
Ai
r P
ho
to
 C
ol
le
ct
io
n 
 0
31
1-
41
20
Jacques Dextraze (1919-1993) was 
born in Montreal and served with the 
Fusiliers Mont-Royal during the Second 
World War, eventually commanding 
the battalion. He was awarded the 
Distinguished Service Order and bar 
for his actions during the war. Later, he 
commanded the 2nd Battalion, Royal 
22e Régiment in Korea and served 
with the Canadin Army on various 
UN deployments. He rose to the rank 
of general and ending his career as the 
Canadian Forces’ chief of the defence staff 
from 1972-77. 
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